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ASSIGNMIENTS-GARNISHMENT-PRIORITY OF ASSIGNEE OVER CREDITOR
ATTACHING SUBSEQUENTLY WITHOUT NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT,-A was in-
debted to B in the sum of $332.86 for merchandise purchased. B assigned
the claim to C. Subsequent to the assignment D, a creditor of B, garnished
the claim of B in the hands of A and secured a judgment of condemnation.
C, who had failed to notify A of the assignment until after entry of the
judgment, filed a petition asking that the judgment be stricken out and
that he be allowed to intervene as claimant. The lower court denied the
petition. Held, that the judgment be reversed. McDowell v. Hopfield
(1925, Md.) 128 Atl. 742.
The claims of an assignee who gives the debtor notice of the assignment
before service of garnishment will be preferred over those of an attaching
creditor. Kitzinger v. Beek (1894) 4 Colo. App. 206, 35 Pac. 278. In case
notice of the assignment is given to the debtor after service of garnish-
ment, but in time to enable the debtor to set up the assignment as a de-
fense to the garnishment" process, the assignee generally prevails over the
garnishor. Newman v. Manning (1881) 79 Ind. 218; McIntyre v. Hauscr
(1900) 131 Calif. 11, 63 Pac. 69; Home v. Stevens & L. Steam Mill Co.
(1887) 79 Me. 262, 9 Atl. 616; contra: Woodbridge v. Perkins (1809,
Conn.) 3 Day, 364; Dillingham v. Traders' Ins. Co. (1907) 120 Tenn. 302,
108 S. W. 1148. After judgment in garnishment, however, many courts
hold, contrary to the principal case, that the garnishor will be preferred
over the assignee. Walters v. Washington Ins. Co. (1855, Iowa) 1 Clark,
404; Coburn v. Currens (1866, Ky.) 1 Bush, 242; contra: MacDonald v.
Kneeland (1861) 5 Minn. 352; cf. Bellingham Boom Co. v. Brisbois (1896)
14 Wash. 173, 44 Pac. 153. This position seems to be based on the re-
luctance of courts to invalidate a judgment already entered, and on the
ground that the attaching creditor has gone to some expense in securing
the judgment and that his ability to resort to other means of collecting
the claim may have been prejudiced. The holding of the principal case,
however, seems to be more in line with the prevailing view of the nature
of an assignment. As between assignor and assignee, an assignment of
a chose in action is complete without notice to the debtor. In ro Cin-
cinnati Iron Stove Co. (1909, C. C. A. 6th) 167 Fed. 486. An assignment
passes the whole right of the assignor to the assignee, and the assignor
has no further interest in the subject matter of the assignment. Collier
v. Alexander (1905) 142 Ala. 422, 38 So. 244. An attaching creditor should
not stand on a better footing than his debtor. Upon this theory the
garnishee owes nothing to the assignor which can be reached by the gar-
nishing creditor, the requirement of notice to the debtor being for the
debtor's protection, and not to complete the assignment. As a practical
matter also, the result reached by the principal case seems sound, as the
assignee paid for the particular claim assigned, and, in the absence of
unusual circumstances, it does not seem equitable to defeat the assignment
merely to satisfy the claim of a general creditor of the assignor. For an
analagous problem relative to whether the requirement of notice should
determine priority between two assignees of a chose in action, see Cot-
MENTS (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 767.
ATTACHMENT-JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS IN THE ALTERNATIVE-EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENT FOR WARRANT oF ATTACHMENT,.-In an action for damages for
leaving a ship-hull on his land the plaintiff attached the property of four
non-resident defendants because of doubt as to which was responsible. The
lower court allowed an attachment against each one to stand. Held, that
the attachments as to three of the defendants be vacated, since each attach-
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ment must be supported by as much evidence as would be necessary had
each defendant been separately sued. Zenith Batking Pavilion, Inc. v.
Fair Oaks S. S. Corp. (1925) 240 N. Y. 307, 148 N. E. 532.
A few jurisdictions (Eng., Conn., L. L, N. Y.) permit joinder of defend-
ants in the alternative. Jamison, v. Lamborin (1923, 1st Dept.) 207 App.
Div. 375, 202 N. Y. Supp. 113; (1914) 51 L. RL. A. (N. s.) 040, note; see
also (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 328. But before the plaintiff is entitled
to secure a warrant of attachment under the statute, it is necessary for
him to show that "a cause of action" exists against the defendant. N. Y.
C. P. A., 1921, sec. 902, 903. In the instant case the court probably con-
fused "a cause of action" in sec. 903 with a right of action; that is, a suit
wherein the plaintiff will be successful, and the court accordingly granted
the warrant against one defendant only. See Clark, The Code Ca,,ze of
Action (1924) 33 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 817. But "cause of action" is ap-
parently used in the statute to mean that proper grounds of suit exist for
the plaintiff to bring the defendants to trial, and sections 211 and 213 of
the Practice Act appear definitely to grant the plaintiff such cause of action
against all the defendants. Under these sections a "cause of action" exists
where there is the certainty that some one or more of several partiez is
responsible, coupled with the doubt as to which. Earnes v. Mayo (1919)
93 Conn. 479, 106 Atl. 825. This limitation of the remedy of attachment
in the case of alternative defendants seems undesirable, since it may often
prevent the joinder of parties in the alternative in such cases. In the
instant case, however, the responsibillty of the three defendants against
whom the attachments were vacated was so doubtful on the facts that the
decision would seem sound, but the dicta going beyond the actual decision
seem unjustified.
CoNFLicT Op LAWs-EQUITY--JURISDIOTION OVER EXTmIIRTOnmL Aers.-
The plaintiff leased to the defendant, a Canadian corporation, the privilege
of running its trains over the Niagara Bridge. Subsequently, the plaintiff
brought an action to enjoin the use of the Canadian side for switching
purposes, on the ground that the bridge was being damaged thereby and
that such use was a violation of the contract. Process was personally
served on the defendant. The injunction was denied in the Supreme Court.
The Appellate Division reversed this judgment and the defendant appealed.
Held, that the judgment be modified, and, as modified, affirmed, although to
carry out the decree the defendant might be required to reconstruct its
tracks on the Canadian side. Niagara Falls Intcrnational Bridge Co. v.
Grand Trunk Ry. of Canada (1925, N. Y.) 148 N. E. 797.
It is often asserted "that a court of equity cannot order the doing of an
act outside the territory of its sovereign". Beale, Equity in America (1921)
1' CA m. L. JouR. 21, 27; Port Royal R. R. v. Hamnond (1877) 5S Ga.
523; Noms (1908) 21 HARv. L. Rnv. 354, 355. Yet where the defendant
is before it on personal service, a court of equity may enter a decree in-
directly affecting foreign lands by ordering the defendant to perform acts
within the forum which will accomplish such a purpose. Pcnn v. Lord
Baltinwre (1750, Ch.) 1 Yes. Sr. 444 (specific performance of contract to
convey foreign land). In so doing the court is said to act only in pcmonam.
Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. Twin Falls Samon, River Land & Water Co.
(1917, C. C. A. 9th) 245 Fed. 9; 1 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.
1918) sees. 135, 428; 4 Pomeroy, op. cit. see. 1318; CoeMENTs (1918) 27
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 946. Through the exercise of this power a court may
order the parties before it to desist from committing wrongful acts in
foreign territory to the injury of a rcs within the state of the forum.
Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Worster (1851) 23 N. H. 462; City of Jamentow-n
v. Pennsylvania Gas Co. (1924, C. C. A. 2d) 1 Fed. (2d) 871. In order
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to carry out this negative decree it may be necessary for the defendant to
perform certain affirmative acts on foreign soil, as in the instant case.
Salton Sea Cases (1909, C. C. A. 9th) 172 Fed. 792. But courts have oven
gone a step further and directly ordered the defendant to do such positive
acts beyond their territorial limits. Kempson v. Kempson (1902) 63 N. J.
Eq. 783, 52 Atl. 360 (defendant ordered to set true facts before a foreign
court in an effort to secure revocation of a former decree); Vineyard Land
& Stock Co. v. Twin Falls Salmon River Land & Water Co., supra (court
in Idaho ordered defendant to place water meters on its land in Nevada, and
to allow plaintiff to go upon such land for purpose of inspection); Madden
v. Rosseter (1921, Sup. Ct. Spec. T.) 114 Misc. 416, 187 N. Y. Supp. 462
(mandatory injunction granted and receiver appointed to procure a horse
in California and to ship it to Oklahoma). But see 1 Beale, Conflict of
Laws (1916) sec. 106; NoTms (1918) 31 HARv. L. Rav. 646, 648. The objec-
tion that such an order is unenforceable is met by requiring the defendant
to post a bond, or by delegating an agent to perform the act. See (1921)
30 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 865, 866. The latter method was successfully
adopted in Madden v. Rosseter, supra. The statement "that a court of
equity cannot order the doing of an act outside the territory of its sover-
eign" seems, therefore, to need considerable qualification. Where the tort
does not affect a local res, however, it is often deemed expedient to refuse
tO exercise such power. Northern hnd. R. R. v. Michigan Central R. R.
(1853) 56 U. S. 233.
CONSTITUTIONAI, LAW-ASSOCIATION-STATUTE REQUIRING CERTAIN As-
SOCIATIONS TO DiscLOsE MEMBERSHIP, OATH AND RosTER.-A New York
statute required secret organizations, except those specifically enumerated,
to file with the secretary of state certain information as to the membership,
laws and oath of the society, making it a misdemeanor to attend a meeting
with knowledge that the association had failed to do so. The defendant
attended a Ku Klux Klan meeting, was arrested, and after conviction ap-
pealed on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional. Held, that the
statute did not violate the personal liberty and equal protection clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment. People v. Zimmerman (1925, 4th Dept.) 213
App. Div. 414, 210 N. Y. Supp. 269.
Laws affecting certain classes only are not violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment provided that the classification is based upon a "reasonable"
ground. Lawton v. Steele (1894) 152 U. S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499; People v.
Klinck Packing Co. (1915) 214 N. Y. 121, 108 N. E. 278. After taking
judicial notice of the prejudicial influences of the Ku Klux Klan ("common
knowledge") the court in the instant case reached the satisfactory con-
clusion that the law in question was a proper exercise of the state's police
power. See Otis v. Parker (1902) 187 U. S. 606, 609, 23 Sup. Ct. 168, 169;
La. Acts, 1924, Act. No. 2, sec. 1; Fry, The Ku Klux Klan (1922) 213.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-JUDICIAL REVIEW oF ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS AS
A REQUIREMENT Op DUE PROCESS.-A workman, in the course of his em-
ployment, was injured by a street car of the defendant company. In a
common law action for damages, to the defence that the plaintiff had al-
ready recovered under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the plaintiff
pleaded that the Workmen's Compensation Act was unconstitutional because
it permitted review on questions of law only. The lower court held for the
plaintiff on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional as denying
due process. The defendant appealed. Held, that the judgment be re-
versed. Nega, v. Chicago Rys. (1925, Ill.) 148 N. E, 250.
State decisions have held findings of fact by Workmen's Compensation
tribunals conclusive, but do not appear to have passed upon the constitu-
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tionality of such provisions under the "due process" clause. See (1022)
35 HARV. L. REv. 761; Hughes v. Cudahy Packizg Co. (1921) 192 Iowa,
947, 185 N. W. 614. The instant case follows the tendency of the Supreme
Court to recognize as due process similar provisions regarding adminiz-
trative tribunals. Hawkins v. Bleakly (1916) 243 U. S. 210, 37 Sup. Ct.
255; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific Railroad (1912)
222 U. S. 541, 32 Sup. Ct. 108; Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Adminic-
trative Action (1921) 35 HARv. L. Rnv. 127; Hardman, Judicial RCViGu
as a Requirement of Due Process (1921) 30 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 631;
Isaacs, Judicial Review of Administrative Findings (1921) 30 YmIm LAW
JOURNAL, 781.
CONTRACTS-MODIFICATION OF CONTRACT UNDER SEaL BY SUBSEQUEnT
INFORTAL AGREnEIENT.-The parties to a sealed contract modified its terms
by a subsequent informal agreement. The plaintiff sued for a breach of
the contract and was awarded judgment on the original contract rather
than on the contract as modified. Held, (two judges discenting) that thi3
was proper, for the reason that a sealed contract cannot be modified by an
executory unsealed agreement. Cammack v. Slattcry & Bro., Inc. (1923)
241 N. Y. 39.
At common law a contract under seal could not be modified by a subse-
quent informal agreement Sherwin & Salpaugh v. Rutland & Burlington
Ry. (1852) 24 Vt. 347; Tischler v. KHrtz Bros. (1895) 35 Fla. 323, 17 So.
661. This reliance on mere formality has been severely criticized. Mc-
Creery v. Day (1890) 119 N. Y. 1, 23 N. E. 198; Harris v. Shoral (1921)
230 N. Y. 343, 130 N. E. 572; COMMENTS (1925) 34 YALE LA W JO mu.,
782. In many jurisdictions statutes have been adopted to abolish the
significance of seals. Efta v. Swanson (1911) 115 Blinn. 373, 132 N. W.
335; Donner v. Whitecotton (1919) 201 Mo. App. 443, 212 S. W. 378. Their
importance has been greatly diminished in New York by judicial decisions.
Weeks v. Esler (1894) 143 N. Y. 374, 38 N. E. 377; Chasc Nat. Ba. v.
Faurot (1896) 149 N. Y. 532, 44 N. E. 164. And also by statute. COM1ENT.3
(1925) 34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 783, note 7. Even those jurisdictions adher-
ing to the common law rule, permit the time fixed for the performance of
a contract under seal to be extended by an informal agreement. E.moad v.
Van Benschoten (1852, N. Y.) 12 Barb. 366; Barker v. Troy & Ratland
R. R. (1855) 27 Vt. 766. Whiere the informal agreement modifying a con-
tract under seal has been executed by one of the parties, many juridictions,
including New York, enforce the modified contract. MeCrcc, v. Day,
supra; Jones & Dornmersnas Co. v. Crary (1903) 234 Ill. 26, 84 N. E. 051;
Lion Brewery v. Fricke (1923, 1st Dept.) 204 App. Div. 470, 193 N. Y. Supp.
491. The reason given for this rule is that after one of the parties to the
contract has fully performed in accordance with the terms of the modified
agreement, it would be inequitable to enforce the original contract under
seal. American Food Co. v. Halstead (1905) 105 Ind. 633, 76 N. E. 251.
It would seem that the non-enforcement of the contract as modified might
be equally inequitable in cases of partial performance in reliance thereon.
The same might well be true where the informal agreement remains eat irelv
executory. The Court in the instant case has suggested that any further
relaxation must be accomplished by legislative enactment But the relaxa-
tion in the McCreery case and in other cases was accomplished by the
court without legislative aid; and it is difficult to see why the limit of
judicial power should be placed at this particular point.
CRIINAL LAw-EVIDENCE-ADISSIBILTY OF WiTHDInWN PmA_ op
"GUILTY" AS CoNEssIoN .The defendant pleaded "not guilty" to an indict-
ment for larceny. This plea was subsequently withdrawn and a plea of
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"guilty" entered. Later this plea was withdrawn with the permission of the
court and the plea of "not guilty" reinstated. During cross examination of
the accused he admitted having previously pleaded "guilty". The trial
court admitted the fact of the guilty plea as evidence of a confession. The
defendant was convicted and appealed. Held, (two judges dissenting) that
there was no error, such evidence being admissible. People v. Steinmetz
(1925) 240 N. Y. 411, 148 N. E. 597.
A plea of "guilty" before a magistrate or justice of the peace is almost
universally admitted in evidence as a confession where the accused pleads
"not guilty" on trial. Commonwealth v. Brown (1889) 150 Mass. 330, 23
N. E. 49; State v. Blay (1904) 77 Vt. 56, 58 At. 794; Loman v. State (1924)
19 Ala. App. 611, 99 So. 769. Such evidence is not conclusive, but has the
same effect as a confession proved in any other way. See State v. Bowo
(1873) 61 Me. 171, 176. -And the accused may show the circumstances
under which it was made. State v. Hand (1904) 71 N. J. L. 137, 58 Atl
641. The weight to be given such evidence id for the jury to determine.
State v. Bowe, supra. Nevertheless, where a plea of "guilty" has been with-
drawn with the court's permission, some courts refuse to admit such plea
in evidence. People v. Ryan (1890) 82 Calif. 617, 23 Pac. 121; Heim v.
United States (1918) 47 App. D. C. 485; Heath v. State (1923, Okla.) 214
Pac. 1091; see dissent in State v. Carta (1916) 90 Conn. 79, 87, 96 Atl. 411,
414; NOTES (1916) 3 VA. L. REv. 622. But other courts refuse to bar such a
confession merely because it is made in court, since, if made outside of
court, it would be admitted without question. State v. Bringgold (1905) 40
Wash. 12, 82 Pac. 132; People v. Boyd (1924, Calif.) 227 Pac. 783; State V.
Carta, supra; COMMENTS (1916) 25 YAIE LAW JOURNAL, 587; (1916) 29
HARe. L. REV. 782; (1916) 16 COL. L. REV. 421. It has been suggested that
since courts ordinarily permit the withdrawal of only those pleas which have
been entered mistakenly or unintentionally, the withdrawn plea does not
tend to establish guilt, and hence should be rejected as evidence. See dis-
sent in State v. Carta, supra, at 88, 96 Atl. at 414. While this might be true
in a particular case, it is believed that in many cases it is granted where
the mistake is not clearly established, and the court in its discretion merely
deems it desirable to give the accused a jury trial. As a rule, therefore,
it seems better to admit the evidence, leaving it to the jury to determine
the weight to be given it.
CRIMINAL LAW-INTOXICATING LIQUORS-PERMITTING JURY TO SMELL OR
TASTE LIQUOR IN EVIDENCE.-During trial of the accused charged with
the sale of intoxicating liquor, the court permitted the liquor in evidence
to be given to the jury in open court to taste, smell and handle. Held,
that this was reversible error. Peru v. United States (1925, C. C. A.
8th) 4 Fed. (2d) 881.
This problem has been treated by our courts in a variety of ways. In
some jurisdictions the jury is allowed to -smell liquor in open court on the
theory that in so doing they can determine the probative value of the evi-
dence introduced, and that since they are allowed to use other senses they
should also be allowed to use that of smell. State v. Daseenzo (1924, N.
M.) 226 Pac. 1099; Enyart v. People (1921) 70 Colo. 362, 201 Pac. 564.
And for similar reasons the jury has been allowed to taste. People v.
Kinney (1900) 124 Mich. 486, 83 N. W. 147; Schillenberg v. State (1907)
79 Neb. 65, 112 N. W. 304; State v. Simmons (1922) 183 N. C. 684, 110
S. E. 591. Courts have even permitted the jury to take liquor to the jury
room and to sample it during deliberations. State v. Baker (1912) 67
Wash. 595, 122 Pac. 335; State v. Elmers (1924, Iowa) 200 N. W. 723,
This procedure, though held permissible, has been disapproved. State '.
Burcham (1920) 109 Wash. 625, 187 Pac. 352; Galloway v. State (1900)
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42 Te. Cr. App. 180, 56 S. W. 236. Many jurisdictions, however, hold it
error to allow the jury to smell or taste the liquor in open court, since
such procedure is incompatible with the court's dignity. iJanole v. Unitcd
States (1924, C. C. A- 8th) 299 Fed. 496. Since it allows a juror to give
a verdict founded on his own knowledge. State v. Lindgrovc (1895) 1
Kan. 51, 41 Pac. 688. And since it makes witnesses of the jurors. Gal-
laghan v. United States (1924, C. C. A. 8th) 299 Fed. 172; cf. 2 Wig-
more, Evidence (2d ed. 1923) sees. 1151, 1159. Liquor has been excluded
from the jury room because of its intoicating qualities and the danger of
the jury abusing its privilege while in retirement. Troutvcr v. Common-
wealth (1923) 135 Va. 750, 115 S. E. 693. The instant case, in not per-
mitting the jury either to smell, taste or handle the liquor in open court,
expresses the strictest view.
DomESTic RELATIONS-EFFECT OF A SEPARATION Ar;i=,=NT ON THU
HUSBAND's DUTY TO SurPrOT His Wi E.-The plaintiff entered into a post-
nuptial separation agreement with his wife, each relinquishing all interest
in the other's property, and the wife, her legal right to support by her
husband. Two days later they separated. After her death, he filed a bill
for partition of her real estate. The chancellor decreed that the separation
agreement was a bar to the action. The plaintiff appealed. Held, that
the decree be reversed on the ground that the agreement was void because
a material part of the consideration, the waiving of the husband's duty to
support his wife, was illegal. Lyons v. Schanbachcr (1925, Ill.) 1417 X.
E. 440.
Separation agreements between husband and wife after separation, or
in contemplation of immediate separation, are not per se invalid. Sherman
v. Sherman (1922) 65 Mont. 227, 211 Pac. 321; Daniels v. Benedict (1899,
C. C. A. 8th) 97 Fed. 367. This is recognized in the jurisdiction of the
principal case. Luttrell v. Boggs (1897) 168 Ill. 361, 48 N. E. 171. It
is otherwise, however, with agreements for future separation. Day v.
Chamberlain (1923) 223 Mich. 278, 193 N. W. 824. But the effect of
separation agreements on the husband's duty to support his wife is not
settled. At common law the duty was rigidly enforced, lest the wife be-
come a public charge. Wood v. Wood (1887, C. A.) 57 L. T. R. 740;
(1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 626. It was said to rest on the marriage
status. Ryan v. Dockery (1908) 134 Wis. 431, 114 N. W. 820; Co0,1M.rIT3
(1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 478, notes 11, 22, 32. And mere separation
could not dissolve it. Barefoot v. Barefoot (1914) 83 N. J. Eq. 035, 93
Atl. 192; Stevenson v. Stevenson (1920) 56 Utah, 289, 190 Pac. 776. Nor
would the fact that the wife had an independent income affect the hus-
band's duty. Ott v. Hendali (1900) 70 N. H. 231, 47 Atl. 80; State v.
English (1915) 101 S. C. 304, 85 S. E. 721. The husband was released,
however, if the separation was the fault of the wife. Friend v. Friend
(1886) 65 Wis. 412, 27 N. W. 34. Consequently cases still hold, as in
the present case, that the duty to support the wife is unchanged by a
separation agreement. Boehm v. Boehm (1917) 88 N. J. Eq. 74, 101 Atl.
423; Rearden v. Rearden (1923) 210 Ala. 129, 97 So. 138. In New Yorl:
a statute incorporates the common law rule. 2 Birdseye's N. Y. Cons.
Laws (2d ed. 1917) 1877, sec. 51; Tirreli v. Tirrell (1921) 232 N. Y. 224,
133 N. E. 569. Of. Winter v. Winter (1908) 191 N. Y. 462, 84 N. E. 22
(where an agreement to pay the wife a weeklJy sum was held valid as a
recognition of the duty). But with the steadily growing independence of
woman, such a view of public policy seems less necessary. Cf. Weatcrfietd
v. Westerfield (1882) 36 N. J. Eq. 195; also, Daniel v. Benedict,
supra; (1902) 55 CENT. L. Joun. 383. And many cases, therefore, hold
that the duty is strictly to be limited to the terms of the agreement. East-
YALE LAW JOURNAL
land v. Burchell (1878) L. R. 3 Q. B. 432 (where the agreement barred the
wife from pledging the husband's credit); Parsons v. Tracy (1923) 127
Wash. 218, 220 Pac. 813 (where the wife's estate was held responsible to
reimburse husband). Similarly in California it is provided by statute that
the husband's duty is to be measured only by the agreement. Calif. Civil
Code, 1923, sec. 175. In re Bose (1910) 158 Calif. 428, 111 Pac. 258. But
even if the traditional common law view is accepted, its application in the
present case, as an aid to the husband, who, as a matter of fact, had not
fulfilled his duty, seems inconsistent with its purpose.
EASEMENTS--TERMINATION UPON CESSATION OF USE OF DOMINANT ESTATE
FOR PURPOSE STIPULATED IN GRANT.-A right of way was granted upon con-
dition that it should cease if the premises used "as a stable and yard for
horses and wagons" should cease to be "used . . . in the [carting] busi-
ness". The grantees conveyed to' a laundry company, whereupon the
grantor brought his action to extinguish the right of way. Held, that it be
extinguished. Hohman v. Rochester Swiss Laundry Co. (1925, Sup. Ct.)
125 Misc. 584.
Easements are normally acquired by prescription or by grant. In the
former case the user by which the easement originated determines its nature
and extent. Koenigs v. Jung (1888) 73 Wis. 178, 40 N. W. 801. In the
latter these depend upon the terms of the deed. An easement may be
granted for a definite period. Goddard, Easements (8th ed. 1921) 134.
Or, on the analogy of a fee on special limitation, for a period to be deter-
mined on the happening of a certain event. Ardley v. St. Pancras Guard-
ians (1870, Ch.) 39 L. J. 871. Such event in the instant case was the
cessation of use of the dominant premises in the carting business. A fee
granted on a similar limitation would revert to the grantor when use for
the specified purpose ceased. Cf. Irby v. Smith (1917) 147 Ga. 329, 93
S. E. 877. Easements are deemed to be of a more ephemeral character than
corporeal estates.' The latter, as between the parties, can be extinguished
only by deed or will. The former are destructible by mere abandonment,
even though created by grant. Louisville Trust Co. v. Cincinnati (1896,
C. C. A. 6th) 76 Fed. 296. A fortiori where by stipulation in the deed of
grant the easement ceases upon termination of the use for which it was
granted, such easement would not survive.
EMINENT DOMAIN-APPROPRIATION OF LAND BY STATE-COMPENSATION
FOR GOOD WILL OF BusiNEss.-Pursuant to a statute, the state appropriated
for barge canal purposes property of appellant used for a flour mill since
1887. The Court of Claims granted compensation for the taking of the
land, the structures thereon, and the power plant, and for the damage to
the machinery and fixtures, but allowed nothing for the good will of the
business. Held, that the judgment be affirmed. Banner Milling Co. v. State
of New York (1925) 240 N. Y. 533.
The instant case is in accord with the accepted doctrine in this country.
Sawyer v. Commonwealth (1902) 182 Mass. 245, 65 N. E. 52; Becker v.
Phila. R. R. (1896) 177 Pa. 252, 35 Atl. 617; City of Oakland v. Pacific
Lumber & M. Co. (1915) 171 Calif. 392, 153 Pac. 705; 1 Nichols, Eminent
Domain (2d ed. 1917) sec. 124. The reasons generally given for this view
are that there is no "taking" of "property", and that the damages are too
speculative. A taking may'be any destruction, restriction, or interruption
of the common necessary use and enjoyment of property. (1916) 25 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 245; Peabody v. United States (1913) 231 U. S. 530, 34 Sup.
Ct. 159; In re Saratoga, Ave. (1919) 226 N. Y. 128, 123 N. E. 197. Good
will is recognized and protected as "property" in matters of private law.
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People v. Dederick (1900) 161 N. Y. 195, 55 N. E. 927. Thus it is a proper
subject matter for a sale. Howard v. Taylor (1890) 90 Ala. 241, 8 So. 36.
And it may be disposed of by will Bradbury v. Wells (1903) 138 Iowa, 673,
115 N. W. 880. There seems to be nothing inherent in the nature of good
will which prevents it from being considered as property in matters of
eminent domain also. The difficulty of the speculative nature of the claim
has not been found insurmountable in other jurisdictions. Rex. v. Cordon
(1909) 12 Can. Exch. 275; White v. Commissionwrs of Public Wors.- (1870,
Exch.) 22 L. T. 591. The American view seems too narrow, since it results
in a taking of recognized economic values without compensation.
EQUITY-PoWERS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PAR1ENS PAvaL n-The plain-
tiff brought action against his wife to share in the custody of their children.
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the plead-
ings. The Appellate Division reversed this judgment. Held, that the judg-
ment of the Appellate Division be reversed and that of the trial court af-
firmed, since the court had no statutory authorization to make such an
award; even though the inherent equity powers of the court, under the
doctrine of parens patrae, might be invoked by a petition reciting that the
interests of the child demanded the relief requested. Fnlay v. Fhdlay
(1925) 240 N. Y. 429, 148 N. E. 624.
In feudal times, the king, by virtue of being protector of all his subjects,
undertook to care for and defend them. Infants, especially, came within
the scope of the crown's benevolence; and the chancellor, as the hing's
personal representative, had power to act for such infants without special
authorization. Eyre v. Countess of Shaftesbury (1722, Ch.) 2 P. Wins. 103;
2 Fonblanque, Treatise of Equity (1835) Bk. II, Pt. II, ch. 2, scc. 1, note a.
The statute of 32 Hen. 8, c. 46, establishing a Court of Wards, took over
this jurisdiction of the chancellor to whom it again reverted upon the
abolition of this court, Morgan v. Dillon (1724, Ch.) 9 Mod. 135; 3
Blackstone, Commentaries, *427. The origin of this jurisdiction has been
likened to that over insane persons; but the latter was originally vested in
the immediate overlords, was granted to the crown by act of Parliament,
and was exercised by the king through a special commission to the chancel-
lor. Fonblanque, lec. cit. szpra. It has also been put on the ground that
a guardianship is a trust, although the property element is obviously lad:-
ing. Duke of Beaufort v. Berty (1721, Ch.) 1 P. Wins. 703. One famouo
authority has called it a mere usurpation. 1 Butl. & Harg., Co. Litt., OSSB,
note 70, par. 16. Whatever the origin, this jurisdiction was well establishcd
by the beginning of the eighteenth century. Tcyaham v. Lcmzard (1724, H.
L) 2 Bro. P. C. 539; Wellescy v. Wellesky (1828, H. L.) 2 Bli. (,z. S.) 124.
It has been generally recognized in the United States. Cowls v. Cowls (1846)
8 Ill. 435; Wilcox v. Wilcox (1856) 14 N. Y. 575. But because of statutes
empowering other courts to care for infants, equity's jurisdiction has fallen
into disuse. Berry v. Johnson (1866) 53 Me. 401; Ex parte Dawson (1355,
N. Y.) 3 Bradf. 130. The power to act, if invoked, has nevertheless con-
tinued unimpaired. Jensen v. Early (1924, Utah) 22S Pac. 217. A pe-
titioner can appeal to this jurisdiction by a bill in equity, a writ of habeas
corpus, or a petition without a bill. Wilco, v. Wilcox, -upra; Earl of
Shaftesbury v. Slwftesbury (1725, Ch.) Gilb. Rep. 172. Theoretically, on
a writ of habeas corpus the chancellor releases the infant from its re-
straint, and, having taken jurisdiction, proceeds to determine the rights of
the parties litigating. Under the petition, however, the rights of the parties
are determined only incidentally. Queen v. GyngalU (1893) L. R. 2 Q. B.
232. But in practical effect there is little difference. This equitable relief
may be invoked by any interested person. In re Grcen (1923) 192 Calif.
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714, 221 Pac. 903; Baird v. Baird (1868) 19 N. J. Eq. 481. The welfare
of the child is sufficient to induce equity to act, even though no property
rights are involved. Ex parte Badger (1920) 286 Mo. 139, 226 S. W. 936.
But poverty of the parents alone is no ground for equity's intervention.
Ex parte Kirschner (1920, N. J. Eq.) 111 Atl. 737. As betwen parent
and stranger, the "natural" right of the parent to custody prevails, unless
by agreement or conduct he has divested himself thereof. Hickey v. Thayer
(1911) 85 Kan. 556, 118 Pac. 56; Jensen v. Early, supra. But the infant's
welfare may influence the court to refuse custody to a parent in favor of a
stranger. In re Williams (1910) 77 N. J. Eq. 478, 77 Atl. 350. As between
two parents, living apart, as in the instant case, despite the father's common
law right of custody, the child's best interests are paramount. In re Pin-
%ell's Guardianship (1921) 52 Calif. App. 177, 198 Pac. 215.
INSURANCE-FORFEITURE OF POLICY FOR NON-PAYMIENT OF PREAMUA NoTns.
-A life insurance policy provided that if premiums were not paid when due,
the policy should ipso facto. become null and void. By statute it was
provided that the "policy shall constitute the entire contract". On one
premium date the insured executed and delivered to the defendant a note
with a provision that if not paid when due, the defendant should be released
from all responsibility under the policy. The note was not paid. The in-
sured died shortly thereafter, and the plaintiff, as beneficiary, sought to
recover on the policy. The lower court gave judgment for the plaintiff,
and the defendant appealed. Held, that the judgment be affirmed, as the
note was received as absolute payment of the premium, and the provision
in the note was nugatory. Ritter v. American Life Ins. Co. (1925, S. D.)
203 N. W. 503.
Where neither the premium notes nor the policy provide that the policy
shall lapse on non-payment of the notes at maturity, default in payment
will not terminate the policy. Arkansas Ins. Co. v. Cox (1908) 21 Okla.
873, 98 Pac. 552; Intersouthern Life Ins. Co. v. Duff (1919) 184 Ky. 227,
211 S. W. 738. But if such a provision is found in the policy, or policy and
note, forfeiture will occur on non-payment of the note. Pitt v. Berkshiro
Life Ins. Co. (1868) 100 Mass. 500; Crafton v. Home Ins. Co. (1922) 190
Ky. 517, 251 S. W. 992. Where, however, the condition is in the premium
note only, there is a sharp conflict as to its effect. Some courts, in the
absence of statute, have held such provisions nugatory on the ground that
the policy and application constitute the entire contract. Home Fire Ins.
Co. v. Staneell (1910) 94 Ark. 578, 127 S. W. 966. Sometimes, as in the
instant case, statutes require this construction. Coughlin v. Reliance Life
Ins. Co. (1925, Minn.) 201 N. W. 920. Consequently, the note when received
is held to be payment of the premium. Arnold v. Empire Life Ins. Co.
(1908) 3 Ga. App. 685, 60 S. E. 470. But the better view, it would seem,
is to give effect to provisions in premium notes, stipulating for forfeiture in
case of default in payment, on the theory that the note is a separate agree-
ment whereby the due date for the payment of the premium is extended,
Holly v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1887) 105 N. Y. 437, 11 N. E. 507;
Resseler v. Fidelity Life Ins. Co. (1903) 110 Tenn. 411, 75 S. W. 735,
Failure to pay the note, which is failure to pay the premium, should and
does result in forfeiture. Hale v. Michigan Farmers' Mutual Ins. Co.
(1907) 148 Mich. 453, 111 N. W. 1068; Underwood v. Security Life &
Annuity Go. (1917) 108 Tex. 381, 194 S. W. 585. Some courts have allowed
the insurer full recovery on premium notes after default in their payment.
Such are cases where in consideration for the insurer's promise to continue
the policy in force, the face value of the note is expressly agreed to be the
premium rate for the extension period in case the note is unpaid. Jefferson
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Mut. Ins. Co. v. Murray (1905) 74 Ark. 507, 86 S. W. 813; see Williamc v.
Albany City Ins. Co. (1870) 19 Mich. 451, 465. But it is submitted that a
more equitable result is reached by permitting recovery of the pro 7'ata
amount of the premium for the period covered. Continental Ins. Co. v.
Stratton (1919) 185 Ky. 523, 215 S. W. 416. Even where statutes have
constituted the policy the entire contract, provisions contained only in pre-
mium notes have been enforced. Thus, where a policy had lapsed, and a
premium note was given for reinstatement, forfeiture was allowed on the
ground that a new policy of insurance had been made. Keller v. North Am.
Life Ins. Co. (1922) 301 IlL. 198, 133 N. E. 726. One court has gone so
far as to say that the statute applies only to the original contract of in-
surance and does not extend to subsequent note agreements. Southland Lift
Ins. Co. v. Hopkins (1922, Tex. Comm. App.) 244 S. W. 989.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-VIOLATION oF THE VoI sTD ACr As A Crai= IN-
VOLVING "MlORAL TuRPITumf" -A former police officer, who had been retired
on account of injuries received in the performance of his duties, was con-
victed of the unlawful possession and transportation of intoxicating liquors
in violation of the National Prohibition Law. The commissioners of the
District of Columbia, pursuant to a statute empowering them to discontinue
pension relief to any person convicted of a crime involving "moral turpi-
tude", dropped him from the pension roll. He brought suit for reinstate-
ment and the lower court directed a writ of mandamus so ordering. The
commissioners appealed. Held, (one judge dissenting) that the judgment
be reversed. Rudolph v. United States (1925, D. C.) 6 Fed. (2d) 487.
The principal case was one of first instance. Four analagous situations
may properly be considered. (1) A violation of state or local liquor laws
by an attorney has been held to involve "moral turpitude" for purposes of
disbarment. State v. Edmunson (1922) 103 Or. 243, 204 Pac. 619; In Ire
Callicotte (1920) 57 Mont. 297, 187 Pac. 1019; Underwood v. Commonwealth
(1907) 32 Ky. L. 32, 105 S. W. 151. (2) An accusation of violating the liquor
laws is a charge of a crime involving "moral turpitude" and is actionable
as slander per se. Jahpa v. Starkey (1924, Minn.) 200 N. W. 811 (charge
of manufacture and sale of "moonshine") ; Smith, v. Smith (1855, Tenn.) 2
Sneed, 473 (charge of unlawfully selling spiritous liquors to a slave); cf.
Ba.cter v. Mohr (1902, City Ct. N. Y.) 37 Blisc. 833, 7G N. Y. Supp. 932
(charge of drunkenness not a charge of a crime involving "moral turpi-
tude"); contra: Morgan v. Kennedy (1895) 62 Minn. 348, 64 N. W. 912.
(3) A physician's license cannot be revoked for the illegal sale of intoxicat-
ing liquors under a statute authorizing such revocation on conviction for a
crime involving "moral turpitude". Fort v. City of Brinkley (1903) 87 Ark
400, 112 S. W. 1084. (4) Violation of the liquor laws does not involve
"moral turpitude" so as to affect the credibility of a witness, even though
the act is made a statutory felony. Ex parte Marshall (1922) 207 Ala.
566, 93 So. 471; Cooper Grocery Co. v. Neblctt (1918, Tex. Civ. App.) 203
S. W. 365. It seems, then, that an act which will be considered as involving
"moral turpitude" for one purpose will not necessarily be so considered for a
different purpose. The court in the instant case reaches its conclusion, not
by deduction from a "pre-existing or fixed rule of law, but on the basis of
its views of morality and sound public policy, with which other courts may
perhaps disagree.
LIFE ESTATES-RESTRAINTS ON ALwENATION.In a document embodying
an antenuptial agreement, the testator demised to the plaintiff lands for
the term of her natural life, using a printed form of lease. A clause pro-
vided for forfeiture, if the lessee should assign or sublet without the
lessor's written consent. Subsequent to the lessor's death, the lessee
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sublet. To establish her privilege of assigning and to enjoin interference
therewith the lessee filed her bill against the reversioners and the husband's
executors. The lower court found for the plaintiff, on the ground, inter
alia, that such a provision in a life lease is void as an unreasonable restraint
on alienation. Held, (three judges dissenting) that the judgment be
affirmed. Hess v. Haas (1925, Mich.) 203 N. W. 471.
While the majority of the court seems to have avoided specific affirmation
or rejection of the principle that this provision in the life lease was void
as a restraint on alienation, the dissenting opinion raises the question
squarely. Restraints on alienation of life estates are sought to be effected
in two ways. One is by providing in the conveyance an absolute restraint,
i. e., that the lessee cannot avoid the stipulation and that any assignment
is inoperative, which provisions are held to be void. Gray, Restraints on
the Alienation of Property (2d ed. 1895) sees. 10, 134; McCleary v. Ellis
(1880) 54 Iowa, 311, 6 N. W. 571; Wellington v. Janvrin (1880) 60 N. H.
174; Brandon v. Robinson (1811, Ch.) 18 Ves. 429; contra: Henderson v.
Harness (1898) 176 Ill. 302, 52 N. E. 68; but see Kales, Future Interests
(1920) 393. The other is by inserting a provision, as in the instant case,
for forfeiture on alienation. This provision is usually held to be a valid
restriction. Nichols v. Eaton (1875) 91 U. S. 716; Barnes v. Gunter (1910)
111 Minn. 383, 127 N. W. 398; Gray, op. cit., sec. 78; 1 Tiffany, Landlord and
Tenant (1910) sec. liB; Kales, loc. cit. This is so, even though the forfeit-
ure is based upon a proviso of cesser and not on a gift over. Cf. Jackson V.
Silvernail (1818, N. Y.) 15 Johns. 278; Jackson v. Schutz (1820, N. Y.)
18 Johns. 174; see Hurst v. Hurst (1882) 21 Ch. Div. 278, 283; Pierson v.
Dolman (1866) L. R. 3 Eq. 315; Joel v. Mills (1857, Ch.) 3 K. & J. 458.
It is true this forfeiture clause will not be construed as a condition subse-
quent upon breach of which the estate will cease, where it can be inter-
preted, without violation to its terms, as a mere covenant. Hague v.
Ahrens (1892, C. C. A. 3d) 53 Fed. 58; In re Levinson (1923, W. D. Wash.)
295 Fed. 146. Still even a covenant restraining alienation if it provides
to the lessor, as here, the right of re-entry is operative. Don v. Post
(1855, Sup. Ct.) 25 N. J. L. 285; In re Levinson, supra. Where any clause
is ambiguous in its terms, however, it will be construed in favor of the
grantee. Burns v. Dufresne (1912) 67 Wash. 158, 121 Pac. 46; (1920) 29
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 568; 1 McAdam, Landlord and Tenant (4th ed. 1910)
sec. 141. Thus an assignment by operation of law does not violate a
covenant not to assign. Farnum v. Hefner (1889) 79 Calif. 575, 21 Pac.
955; Charles v. Byrd (1888) 29 S. C. 544, 8 S. E. 1. The reason being that
restrictive clauses are viewed with disfavor by the courts and accordingly
are interpreted very strictly. Hilsendegen v. Hartz Clothing Co. (1911)
165-Mich. 255, 130 N. 1W. 646; Riggs v. Pursell (1876) 66 N, Y. 193. The
Supreme Court found in the instant case that the condition of forfeiture
for subletting contained in the regular printed lease form and duly agreed
to by both parties, while consistent with the purposes of an ordinary short
term lease, was necessarily inconsistent with the intent of the parties to
convey a life estate. How much this surprising conclusion was influenced
by the disfavor with which all courts regard any restraint on alienation
can only be conjectured, but such bias should not permit a court to read
out of such covenants that which they really contain. See Gazlay v. Williams
(1906, C. C. A. 6th) 147 Fed. 678, 681.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ZONING-AESTHETIC CONSIDERATIONS AND EX-
TENT or POLICE PowER.-Under a zoning ordinance prohibiting the mainte-
nance of hospitals in a certain residential district, the plaintiff sought to
restrain the defendant from maintaining a hospital for minor operations
and maternity cases. Held, that the restrictions were arbitrary, "Lesthetic
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considerations" alone being insufficient. Mayor of Wilmington V. Turl.
(1925, Del.) 129 Atl. 512.
Aesthetic considerations alone have generally been held insufficient as a
basis for zoning ordinances. Byrnze v. Maryland Realty Co. (1916) 129
Md. 202, 98 At. 547; COIMENTS (1920) 30 YALE LAw JounrAL, 171; NoTms
(1921) 34 HAnv. L. REv. 419. But many courts have had no difficulty in
finding other grounds on which the statutes could be sustained. Athinson v.
Piper (1923) 181 Wis. 519, 195 N. W. 544; Townc of Windsor v. Whitncy
(1920) 95 Conn. 357, 111 Atl. 354. Thus apartment houses have been
barred from residential districts, the court finding considerations of public
health, safety, and welfare involved. Milkr v. Los Angelcs (1925, Calif.)
234 Pac. 381. Likewise two-family houses. Brett v. Building Commisiaoncr
of Brookline (1924) 250 Mass. 73, 145 N. E. 269. So also stores. In-
spector of Buildings v. Stokloska (1924) 250 Mass. 52, 145 N. E. 262. But
some courts have reached a contrary result by a strict interpretation of
what constitutes public health, safety, and welfare. Jcrscy Land Co. -e.
Scott (1924, Sup. Ct. N. J.) 126 Atl. 173; Spann v. Dallas (1921) Ill Tex.
350, 235 S. W. 513. The police power, however, is flexible and adaptable
to the securing of new social objectives. M1illcr v. Los Avgcles (1925,
Calif.) 234 Pac. 381, 383. And order and beauty in the development of a
city has in one case been recognized as per sc sufficient justification for a
zoning ordinance. Ware v. Wichita (1923) 113 Kan. 153, 214 Pac. 99.
See also State v. Harper (1923) 182 Wis. 148, 157, 196 N. W. 451, 454;
State v. New Orleans (1923) 154 La. 271, 283, 97 So. 440, 444. But apart
-from aesthetic considerations, it has been held that the maintenance of
maternity hospitals in residential dictricts may be enjoined. Dcaconcss
Home and Hospital v. Bontjes (1904) 207 Il. 553, 69 N. E. 748.
SALEs-MEAsuRE oF DAMAGES FOR NON-SuiPMENT-The defendant
agreed to sell to the plaintiff straw braid, delivery f. o. b. New York, to
be shipped from China during September, October, and November. Ship-
ment was not made. The market price rose during November and Decem-
ber, but fell during February and March, at which time the cargo should
have arrived, had shipment been made in November. Held, that the trial
judge correctly instructed the jury that damages should be ascezscd as
the difference between the contract price and the market price during Feb-
ruary and March. Sehopflocher v. Zimzmerman (1925) 240 N. Y. 507.
The measure of damages under the Uniform Sales Act, eec. 67 (3) de-
pends upon whether the time for delivery is fixed. Where no time is speci-
fied, damages are computed as of the time of breach. Antonacopoido3 v.
Arax Co. (1919) 234 Mass. 125, 125 N. E. 161. Likewise at common law.
Heller v. Ferguson (1915) 189 Mo. App. 484, 176 S. W. 1126. Where the
time for shipment is specified, the time for delivery is deemed fixed within
sec. 51 of the English Sale of Goods Act (from which Uniform Sales Act,
see. 67 (3) was taken). Mclachrino v. Nickoli & Knight [1920] 1 K. B.
693 (which was followed by the court in the instant case). Damages are
then computed as the difference between the contract price and the mar-
ket price of the goods at the time when and the place where they ought to
have been delivered. Lehmn v. Schapira Bros. (1923, 1st. Dept.) 206 App.
Div. 474, 201 N. Y. Supp. 503; Hart v. Marbury (1921) 32 Fla. 317, 90
So. 173 (not under Sales Act). Except under special circumstances show-
ing proximate damages of a greater amount. Halstead Lumber Co. v.
Sutton (1891) 46 Kan. 192, 26 Pac. 444 (goods for special purpose); Irwin
v. Kelly (1912) 176 Ill. App. 178 (re-sale contract of which vendor has
knowledge). The rule of sec. 67 (3) is founded on the common law princi-
ple that the injured party should be placed in the same position as though
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the contract had been fulfilled. 2 Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) sec. 599;
Melachrino v. Nickoll & Knight, supra; Williams Bros. v. Agius [1914,
H. L.] A. C. 510, 522. This principle would seem to be more accurately
applied under circumstances similar to those in the instant case, if damages
were to be computed as the difference between the contract price and the
New York market price in November of a cargo to be delivered in the
future (February). Such a rule would seem practicable. Cf. Staackman
& Co. v. Cary (1916) 197 Ill. App. 601, 607; cf. Goldfarb v. Campo Corp.
(1917, Sup. Ct.) 99 Misc. 475, 164 N. Y. Supp. 583 (damages for antici-
patory breach assessed according to the probable future value of the goods
at the time for delivery); cf. Sharp v. Nosawa [1917] 2 K. B. 814 (where,
under the English Sale of Goods Act, the delivery of the documents was
deemed constructive delivery of the cargo, and damages were computed as
of the time the documents should have arrived, six weeks before the cargo).
Also, had the vendee in the instant case re-purchased at the higher price
prevailing before the time for delivery it is at least questionable whether
the excess price paid could be recovered as proximate damages under sec.
67 (3). Such damages were allowed in Kansas Flour Mills Co. v. Brandt
(1916) 98 Kan. 587, 158 Pac. 1120 (not under Sales Act); contra: Mis-
souri Furnace Co. v. Cochran (1881, C.C.W.D.Pa.) 8 Fed. 463 (not under
Sales Act). As a strict application of the Uniform Sales Act, see. 67 (3),
however, the instant case seems sound, especially as no proximate damages
of a g reater amount were shown.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-INSURANCE--VENDEE'S CLAII TO INSURANCE
MONEY RECEIVED BY VENDOR IN ABSENCE OF ASSIGNMENT.-The defendant's
contract for the sale of his farm to the plaintiff was silent as to insurance
on the buildings. Pending the conveyance of the premises the building
burned. The insurance was paid to the defendant. After having paid the
defendant the full purchase price, the plaintiff brought this action to
recover the insurance money received by the defendant. The lower court
entered a decree for the defendant. Held, that the decree be reversed, since
the vendee, as equitable owner, is entitled to the insurance. Brady v. Welsh
(1925, Iowa) 204 N. W. 235.
The English rule was that the vendee, as equitable owner, bore the risk
of loss, but since a contract of insurance was merely "personal" the vendee
was not entitled to the insurance money in the absence of express provisions
in the contract of sale. Rayner v. Preston (1881, C. A.) L. R. 18 Ch. Div. 1;
Poole v. Adams (1864, Ch.) 10 L. T. R. (N. S.) 287. The rule in England,
however, has been changed by act of Parliament. (1922) 12 & 13 Geo. 5,
c. 16, sec. 105; amended (1925) 15 Geo. 5, c. 5, sch. 3, pt. 2, sec. 11. Most
American courts that place the risk of loss on the vendee hold that the
vendor receives the insurance money in trust for the vendee. Russell v.
Elliott (1922) 45 S. D. 184, 186 N. W. 824; Skinner & Sons Co. v. Houghton
(1900) 92 Md. 68, 48 Atl. 85; Vanneman, Risk of Loss, in Equity, Between
Date of Contract to Sell Real Estate and Transfer of Title (1924) 8 MINN,
L. REv. 127, 138. A few American cases, however, are in accord with
Rayner v. Preston, supra. King v. Preston (1856) 11 La. Ann. 95; of.
Brownell v. Board of Education (1925) 239 N. Y. 369, 146 N. E. 630;
COMMENTS (1925) 10 CORN. L. QUART. 379. See also COMMENTS (1924)
34 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 87, 90.
WILLS-RIGHT OF CODICIL LEGATEES TO SHARE OF RESIDUARY BEQUEST
IN ORIGINAL WiLL.-The testator bequeathed several legacies in his will
and directed that the "persons herein named as pecuniary legatees" should
share pro rata in the residue. In two codicils he revoked the legacies of
two pecuniary legatees who had predeceased him and gave these legacies to
new legatees, without directing whether or not they should share in the
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residue. Held, that the codicil legatees took no share in the residue. Lodgo
v. Grnbb (1925, Del.) 130 Atl. 28.
Although will and codicil are to be construed together as part of the same
instrument, the terms of a will should not be disturbed further than is
necessary to give full effect to the codicil. Pcrpont v. Patrick (1873) 53
N. Y. 591; 1 Jarman, Wills (6th ed. 1910) 177. Where a legatee of a will
is given both residuary and non-residuary legacies, the revocation of the
non-residuary legacy does not affect the residuary legacy. Hard 0. Achlcy
(1890) 117 N. Y. 606, 23 N. E. 177; Colt v. Colt (1805) 32 Conn. 422.
When it clearly appears that the new codicil legatees are substituted for
the old will legatees they are permitted to share in the residue. Alsop's
Appeal (1848) 9 Pa. 374 (based on the "theory of subrogation"); cf.
Johnston v. Earl of Harrowby (1859, Ch.) 1 De G. F. & J. 183. Some courts,
viewing the will and codicil as an entirety, allow codicil legatees to share in
the residue even though the codicil does not specifically so provide. Guthrio
v. Guthrie's Ex'r (1916) 168 Ky. 805, 183 S. W. 221. But an emception
is recognized in the case of codicil legatees who are bequeathed an annuity,
because, in the event of a deficiency, the annuity cannot be decreased.
Guthrie v. Guthrle's Ex'r, svpra. The instant case, however, reflects the
almost unanimous view in a field where the courts are always troubled in
determining the supposed intent of the testator. In re Gibson's Thest3
(1861, V. C.) 2 J. & H. 656; Hall v. Sevcnw (1839, Ch.) 9 Sim. 515; contra:
Sherer v. Bishop (1792) 4 Bro. Ch. 42; of. Washburn v. Scwall (1842, Mass.)
4 Mete. 63.
WOiRKMIEN'S COMPENSATION-DEPENDENCY ON WAGES VERSUS DEPFMDENGY
ON WORR.-The plaintiff, the sister of a deceased employee who died of
injuries received during his employment, had been allowed by him to occupy
certain property rent free. Under Acts of Indiana, 1919, (Workmen's Com-
pensation) sec. 37, compensation was provided for those partially dependent
on the earnings of a deceased employee for support. Held, that using em-
ployee's property rent free was not partial dependency on his earnings.
Russell v. McCaughey (1925, Ind.) 147 N. E. 283.
Some statutes provide compensation for those "dependent on the employee
for support" and some for those "dependent on the employee's earnings for
support"; but there seem to be few decisions as to what constitutes de-
pendency on the employee's earnings. The term "dependent" in both
phrases has been liberally construed. Thus contributions by the deceaced
toward the purchase of a home for his parents have been held sufficient.
Jones v. Texas Employers' Insuranwe Co. (1924, Te. Civ. App.) 263 S. W.
1004. Likewise contributions necessary only when crops were poor. Rich-
ardson Sand Co. v. Industrial Commission (1921) 296 II. 335, 129 N. E. 751.
Occasionally "dependent" has been made to include any one who might be
a "recipient of benefits", as where there were gifts of foodstuffs, though no
need therefor was shown. Peabody Coal Co. v. Inddustrial Board of Illiois
(1917) 281 I1. 579, 117 N. E. 983. But when called on to interpret the
phrase "on his earnings for support", courts, as in the principal case, have
adopted a strict construction. In re Derinza (1918) 229 Mass. 435, 118
N. E. 942 (free use of house in Italy); Hassa?3s Case (1922) 240 Macs.
355, 134 N. E. 260; Blozinav. Castile Mining Co. (1920) 210 Blich. 349,
178 N. W. 57; cf. State v. Beltrami County (1915) 131 Minn. 27, 154 N. W.
509. It has been held that contributions need not be in cash to constitute
"support". Southern Surety Co. v. Hibbs (1920, Tex. Civ. App.) 221 S. W.
303 (services rendered); Finney v. Municipality of Croswell (1922) 220
Alich. 637, 190 N. W. 856. Where the deceased employee's income included
both rent and wages, and where the only benefits conferred were cash con-
tributions, the question of allocating benefits to wages was not considered.
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Kenney's Case (1915) 222 Mass. 401, 111 N. E. 47. The fact that the
particular benefit received in the instant case appeared to come from the
employee's property rather than from his pay envelope does not seem to be
a satisfactory test. Had the employee rented the property and used that
income for his own support, while he assisted the plaintiff with his wages,
the plaintiff would have been no more dependent on earnings, than in the
instant case, although probably under the present decision, she could have
recovered in full. It is submitted that whenever a claimant can show
that, because of the inadequacy of the deceased's other sources of income,
the benefits to the claimant must necessarily have been discontinued or
reduced upon a cessation of the deceased's wages, then such claimant should
be held to be dependent on those wages for support to the extent of the
reduction in benefits which the cessation of those wages within the life-
time of the employee would have necessitated.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY "ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT".
-On premises adjoining those on which the plaintiff was employed, a shell,
preserved as a war memorial, exploded and a flying fragment injured the
plaintiff. A claim was made under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and
the State Industrial Board granted an award. This was affirmed in the
Appellate Division and the employer and insurance company appealed.
Held, (two judges dissenting) that the judgment be reversed on the ground
that the injury did not arise but of the employment. MeCarter v. La Rook
(1925) 240 N. Y. 282, 148 N. E. 523.
Most of the American compensation acts provide for compensation for
injuries "arising out of . . . and in the course of the employment". Cf.
Cahill's N. Y. Cons. Laws, 1923, ch. 66, sec. 10. The term "arising out of"
has caused much confusion. Courts have in many cases construed it away
by in effect adopting the so-called "but for" rule of causation. Thus an
injury from lightning was held to arise out of the employment where the
worker was exposed to extraordinary risk. People's Coal and Ice Co. v.
Ramsey County (1915) 129 Minn. 502, 153 N. W. 119; Central Ill. Servico
Co. v. Industrial Commission (1920) 291 Ill. 256, 126 N. E. 144. Likewise,
where a painter, because of dizziness due to indigestion, fell from a ladder.
Gonier v. Chase Co. (1921) 97 Conn. 47, 115 At. 677; (1920) 20 MICH. L.
REV. 687. A chauffeur, attacked by an insane man in the street was con-
sidered to have been exposed to a "street risk" and the injury was hold
compensable. In the Matter of Katz (1922) 232 N. Y. 420, 134 N. E. 330;
(1922) 31 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 563. And one hurt because of "horseplay",
where he was not a participant, was allowed to recover. Matter of Leon.
bruno v. Champlain Silk Mills (1920) 229 N. Y. 470, 128 N. E. 711. In
many similar situations, however, the courts have appeared unwilling to go
so far. Thus an injury from falling down an elevator shaft, when in an
epileptic fit, was held nol compensable. Kelley v. Nichols (1921, 3d Dept.)
199 App. Div. 870, 191 N. Y. Supp. 445. And a night watchman, shot by
an air gun accidentally discharged, was not injured within the Act. Matter
of de Salvo v. Jenkins (1924) 239 N. Y. 531, 147 N. E. 182. Before most
of the American Acts were drafted a writer pointed out the confusion in
the English cases due to the phrase "arising out of" and advised its omission.
Bohlen, The Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts (1911) 25 HARe.
L. REV. 517, 545. A few states have followed this advice, thus in effect ap-
plying the "but for" rule. Pa. Sts. 1920, see. 21983; Throckmorton's Ohio
Gen. Code, 1921, sec. 1465-68. This rule seems to reach a result more in
harmony with the modern tendency to shift the loss from the individual to
society through various forms of insurance. And where "arising out of"
is still retained it would seem desirable to apply the "but for" rule in all
cases.
